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THE WAR POWERS CONSULTATION ACT: KEEPING
WAR OUT OF THE ZONE OF TWILIGHT
Brendan Flynn+
“We have already given in example one effectual check to the Dog of war by
transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative
body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay.” — Thomas
Jefferson1
“When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial
of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a
zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in
which its distribution is uncertain.
Therefore, congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable,
if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.” — Justice
Robert H. Jackson2
“Executive overreach: that’s what Madison saw. But what Madison didn’t
see, what he wasn’t quick enough to see is that legislators like to abdicate. And
the symbiotic relation between legislative abdication and executive overreach
has been the source of this problem up to today.” — Senator Tim Kaine3

+
J.D. candidate, May 2016, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.S.,
2006, United States Coast Guard Academy. The author would like to thank Catholic University’s
General Counsel, COL Lawrence J. Morris, U.S. Army (ret.), for his valuable perspective and his
many insightful comments throughout the process. The author would also like to thank the
Honorable Patrick J. Murphy, former Congressman from Pennsylvania, for his mentorship and
support of the project; and CAPT Glenn M. Sulmasy, U.S. Coast Guard (ret.), for helping to instill
the author’s passion for national security law. Finally, the author would like to thank his parents
Charles and Ann and his wife Lara for their never-ending support, as well as the members of the
Catholic University Law Review for their patience and attention to detail throughout the writing
and editing process.
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 397 (Julian P. Boyd et al., eds., 1958), http://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Jefferson/01-15-02-0375-0003.
2. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
3. Press Release, Sen. Tim Kaine, Kaine Addresses Center for American Progress on the
Role of Congress in the Fight Against ISIS (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.kaine.senate.gov/pressreleases/kaine-addresses-center-for-american-progress-on-the-role-of-congress-in-the-fight-again
st-isis.
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The United States has not formally declared war against another nation since
June 5, 1942.4 Despite this, over the last seven decades the United States has
deployed forces into harm’s way throughout the world, in far-flung places such
as the Korean Peninsula,5 the small leeward Caribbean island of Granada,6 and
the Middle East, without a declaration of war or explicit congressional
authorization.7 Indeed, as of the publication of this Comment, the United States
is currently engaged in armed conflict within the territory of two sovereign
nations—and has been for a full year—without authorization from Congress.8
While the Constitution divides the war powers between Congress, which
declares war (and appropriates the funds to pay for it),9 and the President, who
serves as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces,10 the President has, since
the Korean War, claimed increased authority to send the military into harm’s
way.11 In fact, many of these overseas deployments ordered by the President in
the absence of congressional authorization have been into difficult situations of
uncertain duration.12 Harold Koh, former Dean of Yale Law School and Legal

4. Congress’s last declaration of war was against Rumania on June 5, 1942. H.R.J. Res. 321,
77th Cong., 56 Stat. 307 (1942).
5. See JAMES A. BAKER III ET AL., NATIONAL WAR POWERS COMMISSION REPORT 17
(2008), http://web1.millercenter.org/reports/warpowers/report.pdf.
6. See id. at 18–19.
7. See id. at 17–18.
8. See Dana Milbank, Opinion, Congress: Talking Loud, Doing Nothing, WASH. POST, June
18, 2015, at A2 (discussing “the utter inability of Congress to do its job” in authorizing use of force
against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)); Zeke Miller, Obama Says ‘We Don’t Have
a Strategy Yet’ For Fighting ISIS, TIME (Aug. 28, 2014), http://time.com/3211132/isis-iraq-syriabarack-obama-strategy/ (stating that the United States has been conducting airstrikes on targets
within Iraq since August 8, 2014); Jim Sciutto, Mariano Castillo & Holly Yan, U.S. Airstrikes Hit
ISIS Inside Syria for First Time, CNN (Sept. 23, 2014, 4:11 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/22/
world/meast/u-s-airstrikes-isis-syria/index.html (stating that the first U.S. airstrikes in Syria
occurred early in the morning on September 23, 2014); Obama Authorizes Air Strikes,
Humanitarian Aid Mission in Iraq, ABC NEWS (Aug. 7, 2014), http://abcnews.go.
com/International/us-begins-humanitarian-airdrops-iraq/story?id=24884633 (President Obama
announcing “‘targeted’ air strikes if necessary to protect American interests in Iraq”).
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (establishing Congress’s power to declare war); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (establishing Congress’s power to tax and spend).
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
11. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
12. See BAKER, supra note 5, at 11–17 (discussing the shifting balance of power between
Congress and the President with respect to the power to make war); see also EDWARD KEYNES,
UNDECLARED WAR: TWILIGHT ZONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 1–2 (1982) (discussing
instances of unilateral executive military action and noting that “despite congressional attempts to
limit presidential warmaking . . . recent Congresses have responded pliantly to [military actions
authorized by the President]”).

2015]

Keeping War Out of the Zone of Twilight

1009

Adviser to the Department of State, has characterized the system as one of
“executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance.”13
The War Powers Consultation Act of 2014,14 introduced in January of 2014
by Senators Tim Kaine (D-Va.), John McCain (R-Ariz.), and Angus King (IMe.),15 seeks to re-establish Congress’s role in taking the country to war.16
Benefiting from the bipartisan recommendations of Secretaries James A. Baker
III and the late Warren Christopher, co-chairmen of the National War Powers
Commission,17 the legislation seeks to go beyond the debate concerning the
respective war-making powers of Congress and the President.18 Instead, the
proposal aims to establish a new system that affords meaningful consultation
between the legislative and executive branches of government, along with a
streamlined procedure that obligates Congress to either authorize or approve
“significant armed conflict” in advance of, or immediately following,
commencement of hostilities.19
Part I of this Comment surveys the war powers issue through the lens of
preventing congressional abdication of the constitutional war-making
responsibilities. It begins by examining the two dominant academic approaches
in the area of war powers and discusses how these approaches interpret early
precedent under Presidents John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. Part II illustrates
the exercise of the war powers during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts,
assesses the impact of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 on the war powers
debate, and reaches the conclusion that the approach taken by the War Powers
Resolution has generally failed. Part III analyzes the proposed War Powers
Consultation Act and reaches the conclusion that, while the Act would do a
better job of forcing Congress to have an up-or-down vote on military action,
there are several components of the Act that could be improved.

13. HAROLD KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 117 (1990). Ironically, years after writing these words, Dean Koh made a
major contribution to the expansion of executive authority in war-making. See infra Part I.E.2.
14. S. Res. 1939, 113th Cong. (2014).
15. Id.
16. See id. § 2.
17. See National War Powers Commission, MILLER CTR., http://millercenter.org/policy/
commissions/warpowers (last visited May 23, 2015); see also BAKER, supra note 5, at 12
(discussing the purpose and structure of the National War Powers Commission Report).
18. See BAKER, supra note 5, at 12.
19. S. Res. 1939, 113th Cong., §§ 2, 6–7 (2014). For the definition of “significant armed
conflict,” see infra note 223.
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I. WAR POWERS: THEORY AND PRACTICE
A. Justice Jackson’s Concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer
No discussion of the relationship between executive and legislative power
may begin without first considering the celebrated and influential case of
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,20 popularly known as the “Steel
Seizure case.”21 While the case is not explicitly about war powers, it arose in
the midst of the Korean War, when President Harry S. Truman ordered his
Secretary of Commerce to seize most of the nation’s steel mills in order to
prevent a threatened nationwide work-stoppage by the United Steelworkers of
America.22 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company and other affected steel
companies sued Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer in federal court,
claiming that the President had no authority to seize the steel mills.23 In
response, counsel for the President argued that the executive branch possessed
inherent authority (grounded in historical practice and judicial precedent)24
emanating from the Constitution’s language vesting all “executive power” in a
President,25 the President’s authority as “Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States,”26 and the President’s duty to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.”27
After hearing an expedited appeal from the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in a six-to-three ruling, that President
Truman exceeded his authority by ordering the seizures.28 Although Justice
Hugo Black authored the majority opinion,29 each of the five justices who joined

20. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
21. See BAKER, supra note 5, at 32.
22. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582–83. President Truman cited the exigency of ongoing
combat in Korea in ordering the seizure. See Exec. Order No. 10340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139, 3139
(Apr. 10, 1952).
23. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582–83; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F.
Supp. 569, 572 (D.D.C. 1952), aff’d, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Brief for Plaintiff Cos, Petitioners in
No. 744 and Respondents in No. 745 at 15, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952) (Nos. 744, 745), 1952 WL 82173, at *15.
24. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583–84; see also id. at 641–53 (Jackson, J., concurring)
(discussing the constitutional moorings with respect to the President’s executive powers as
Commander-in-Chief and the Faithful Execution Clause, the historical practice of previous
presidents, and the role of emergency powers).
25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
26. Id. § 2, cl. 1.
27. Id. § 3.
28. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587.
29. Id. at 585 (asserting that the President’s action was not authorized by either the
Constitution or an Act of Congress).
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him wrote separate opinions;30 Justice Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion is
known as the most influential and enduring opinion resulting from the case.31
According to Justice Jackson, “Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate,
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”32 In
Justice Jackson’s self-described “somewhat over-simplified [method of]
grouping,” executive action falls into one of three categories.33 In the first
category, presidential power is at its peak when the President acts “pursuant to
an express or implied authorization of Congress.”34 If executive action in this
area is found to be unconstitutional, “it usually means that the Federal
Government as an undivided whole lacks power” to carry out the act.35 In the
second category, Congress has neither granted nor denied the President the
power to act; therefore, the President can rely only on the power granted to the
Executive by the Constitution,36 generating “a zone of twilight in which [the
President] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain.”37 In these situations, Justice Jackson explains that
“congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence” will allow or even invite the
President to act on his or her own authority without Congress.38 In the third
category, the President is acting contrary to the express or implied wishes of
Congress and can only act in areas where Congress itself has no power to act.39
In conclusion, Justice Jackson determined that since Congress did not approve
the seizure of the steel mills and the President did not avail himself of
congressionally-approved methods for seizing said steel mills, the executive

30. See id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring); Id. at 634
(Jackson, J., concurring); Id. at 655 (Burton, J., concurring); Id. at 660 (Clark, J., concurring).
31. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) and Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654, 661–62 (1981), the Supreme Court explicitly adopted Justice Jackson’s analysis in its
majority opinions. In fact, in Dames & Moore, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist noted that “both
parties agree [Justice Jackson’s concurrence] brings together as much combination of analysis and
common sense as there is in this area.” Id. at 661; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown
Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 224–25 (2002) (observing the trend among legal
academics “to note the eclipse of Justice Hugo Black’s majority opinion by Justice Robert
Jackson’s concurrence”).
32. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 636–37.
36. Id. at 637.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. To exemplify a situation where the President can, while Congress cannot,
constitutionally act, Justice Jackson cites Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106, 176 (1926),
where the Court upheld President Woodrow Wilson’s authority to remove postmasters unilaterally,
despite an act by Congress that declared such removal subject to the advice and consent of the
Senate.
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action was relegated to the third category and the seizure was not authorized
within its narrow confines.40 More than sixty years later, Justice Jackson’s
concurrence remains the primary authority regarding executive action in the
presence or absence of legislative action.41
B. Two Schools of Thought—Two Widely Divergent Approaches
Generally speaking, legal academics and practitioners in the area of war
powers fall into one of two camps: “Congress-First” and “President-First.”42
Each faction relies selectively on authority such as early English practice, the
debates of the Constitutional Convention and subsequent ratification of the
Constitution, practice of Presidents and Congress, and the decisions of the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts.43 There is very little common ground
between these two positions; indeed, as the War Powers Commission points out,
“[a]dvocates on both sides find the answer obvious. Each of their claims to
power, however, is met with contrary legal authority, historical
counterexamples, and countervailing policy arguments.”44
1. Congress-First
Legal scholars and practitioners in the Congress-First camp argue that the
unambiguous words of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 11, the Declare War
Clause—“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o declare War, grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water”45—establish that Congress must act in order to send the nation to war,46

40. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638–40 (Jackson, J., concurring).
41. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
42. Matthew Fleischman, Note, A Functional Distribution of War Powers, 13 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 139, 141–44 (2010) (characterizing approaches to determining the
proper balance of war powers as “Congress-First” or “President-First”); see also MILLER CTR. FOR
PUB. AFFAIRS, UNIV. OF VA., NATIONAL WAR POWERS COMMISSION APPENDIX FOUR: A WAR
POWERS PRIMER 2–5 (2008), http://web1.millercenter.org/commissions/warpowers/appfour.pdf
(employing the terms “Proponents of Congress” and “Proponents of the President”).
43. See, e.g., discussion infra Parts I.B.1–2 (noting the various roots of the Congress-First and
President-First arguments). Much of the language cited from judicial decisions by both war power
factions is dicta, as the Judicial Branch has largely declined to settle these issues. See infra text
accompanying notes 186 and 198.
44. BAKER, supra note 5, at 12.
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11.
46. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 3 (1993) (stating that although often “the ‘original understanding’
of the [Constitution’s] framers and ratifiers can be obscure to the point of inscrutability,” there is
no such confusion when it comes to analyzing the Framers’ original intent with respect to the
separation of war powers); David Gray Adler, The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking: The
Enduring Debate, 103 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 3–8 (1988) (discussing the Framers’ intent behind the War
Clause); Joseph R. Biden, Jr. & John B. Ritch III, The War Power at a Constitutional Impasse: A
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with the President holding, as James Madison suggested, the power only “to
repel sudden attacks.”47 Advocates of the Congress-First view suggest that the
Framers specifically sought to distance themselves from the model of their
English forebears (wherein the King had the power to send the nation to war)
when drafting the Constitution;48 some influential members of the Constitutional
Convention, such as James Madison and James Wilson, identified “[m]aking
peace and war” a legislative function that the King previously appropriated
improperly for himself.49
The Congress-First perspective is bolstered by the prevalent, near-unanimous,
Congress-centric approach in debates at the Constitutional Convention
concerning the war-making powers; for instance, only a single convention
deputy, Pierce Butler of South Carolina, expressed the opinion that the war
powers were most appropriately vested in the President, “who will have all the
requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the Nation will support it.”50
The records of the Convention indicate massive opposition to Rep. Butler’s
sentiment, believing, as articulated by Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, that he
“never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone
to declare war.”51
Further, the Congress-First approach relies on additional language located in
the Declare War Clause, which grants Congress the power to issue “Letters of
Marque and Reprisal” and write “Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water,”52 empowering Congress to authorize limited or “imperfect” wars as well
as general or “perfect” wars.53 Language in early Supreme Court cases
“Joint Decision” Solution, 77 GEO. L.J. 367, 373–74 (1988) (discussing the Framers’ concern
about granting the President war-making power).
47. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 318 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966), http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(fr00286)).
48. See infra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
49. See Adler, supra note 46, at 3–4 (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787 65–66, 73–74 (Max Farrand ed., 1966), http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/
hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(fr00135)):)).
50. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 47, at 318.
51. Id. Madison’s notes indicate that he and Gerry “moved to insert ‘declare,’ striking out
‘make’ war; leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.” Id. Lt. Col. Robert
Bracknell, USMC (Ret.), at the time an active-duty Marine Corps JAG officer, described this
textual amendment as “a curtailing of the originally envisioned power of Congress to ‘make’ war,
dissecting the ‘make war’ power into a ‘declare war’ power for Congress and an executive portion.
Mathematically expressed, ‘make war’ equals ‘declare war’ plus a variable (MW=DW+X), where
the variable X represents the President’s authority.” Robert G. Bracknell, Real Facts, “Magic
Language”, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and Constitutional Authority to Commit Forces to War,
13 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 167, 220 (2007). For more on the machinations of the
Constitutional Convention, see Adler, supra note 46, at 3–8.
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
53. See, e.g., Kathryn L. Einspanier, Note, Burlamaqui, the Constitution, and the Imperfect
War on Terror, 96 GEO. L.J. 985, 988, 992–96 (2008) (discussing the Framers’ intention to give
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concerning the Quasi-War with France would seem to support this view.54 Thus,
from a Congress-First perspective, in any war, general or limited, with the
exception of sudden attack, the President must first obtain Congressional
authorization prior to exercising executive war powers.55
2. President-First
Legal academics and practitioners in the President-First camp interpret the
Declare War Clause much more narrowly.56 To Professor John Yoo and other
advocates of this “insurgent” but increasingly influential perspective,57 the
Framers perceived a declaration of war not as legal authorization to initiate an
armed conflict, but as a simple ministerial function, “a notification mechanism
that defined the wartime rights of citizens and neutrals.”58
President-First advocates define executive powers broadly.59 These advocates
cite Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone for the proposition that the Framers
would have considered all powers related to foreign affairs and war as
“executive” in nature.60 Advocates of the President-First approach also locate
support in the Constitution, highlighting section I of Article II, “[t]he executive
Congress the power to initiate “imperfect” or limited wars, and the President the authority to
“to conduct wars and to repel sudden attacks”); see also HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR
AND PEACE: INCLUDING THE LAW OF NATURE AND OF NATIONS 36 (2007) (noting the distinction
between formal and informal wars, stating that “war is not condemned by the voluntary law of
nations,” and “certain formalities, attending war, were introduced by the law of nations, which
formalities were necessary to secure the peculiar privileges arising out of the law”); but see
Bracknell, supra note 51, at 215 (“A more likely interpretation of the ‘lesser war powers’ is that
they regulate only what the text states: the authorization by Congress of conduct of private parties,
particularly with regard to property, designed to have an effect on an opponent or enemy state.”).
54. See infra Part I.C.1.
55. See Einspanier, supra note 53, at 992.
56. See Fleischman, supra note 42, at 141 (“President-First advocates argue that the War
Powers Clause should be read narrowly to distinguish between outright declarations of war, which
must be authorized by Congress, and initiating hostilities and deploying troops for peace-time
hostilities, which may be authorized by the President.”) (footnotes omitted).
57. See Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A
Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070, 2073 (referring to
this perspective as an “insurgency”). Professor Yoo became fairly well-known outside the legal
academy due to his controversial tenure at the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel during
the George W. Bush Administration. See Paul M. Barrett, A Young Lawyer Helps Chart Shift in
Foreign Policy, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2005), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1126490104254376
70.
58. John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding
of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 244 (1996).
59. See, e.g., id. at 200 (discussing the Lockean notion concerning the importance of a strong
Executive with broad emergency powers); see also Fleischman, supra note 42, at 141 (“[P]roExecutive academics argue that the President seeks [war] voluntarily and that congressional silence
before committing the country to military campaigns is perfectly acceptable . . . .”).
60. See, e.g., JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE 36–37, 40–41 (2005).

2015]

Keeping War Out of the Zone of Twilight

1015

Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America,”61 which,
from a President-First perspective, would seem to vest all powers related to
foreign affairs and national defense in the President, including the initiation of
hostilities.62 Such broad language, effecting a comprehensive vesting of power
in a single person, contrasts with the more limited grant of powers to Congress,
which simply reads that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted.”63
President-First advocates, Professor Yoo in particular, also stress the
influence of the unwritten British Constitution upon the Framers in their
development of the Constitution.64 In the British model, the King initiated war
and the Parliament raised the funds to pay for it.65 Parliament’s only method of
restraining the King was to withhold appropriations necessary to prosecute the
war.66 For these reasons, President-First advocates contend that the President
has the power to send the nation to war without Congress passing a declaration
or authorization of any sort.67
61. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
62. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1677
(2002).
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, supra note 62, at 1677
(stating that “[t]his difference in language indicates that Congress’s legislative powers are limited
to the enumeration of Article I, Section 8, while the President’s powers include inherent executive
powers that are unenumerated in the Constitution”).
64. See YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 60, at 45–54 (discussing the
development of the British war-making power during the colonial era and its effect on the Framers).
This particular element of the President-First ideology has drawn criticism, with prominent
Congress-First advocates—such as Joe Biden—referring to reading in an English influence as
“monarchist” in nature. See Biden & Ritch, supra note 46, at 370–72. Such staunch opposition led
then-Sen. Biden to vote against Justice Samuel Alito’s Supreme Court appointment following the
Justice’s prior refusal to disavow Professor Yoo’s views on war powers. See Aaron Nielson, An
Indirect Argument for Limiting Presidential Power, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 727, 727–28
(2007) (reviewing JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005)). Justice Jackson in his Youngstown concurrence was
similarly dismissive of this concept. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The example of such unlimited executive power that must
have most impressed the forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George III, and the
description of its evils in the Declaration of Independence leads me to doubt that they were creating
their new Executive in his image.”).
65. See WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE
POWER OF THE PURSE 17, 21 (1994) (noting that “colonial assemblies had acquired a stronger
power of the purse than the English House of Commons then enjoyed”).
66. See YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 60, at 49–50 (“The Framers
would have taken note of the ample opportunities available to Parliament to use its financial power
to participate in the development of foreign policy. . . . Continual war demanded continual funding,
and important members of Parliament used their voting power over military appropriations to seek
a cooperative arrangement with the Crown in the setting of foreign policy.”).
67. See, e.g., id., at 178 (discussing President Truman’s reliance on his authority as
Commander-in-Chief to commit forces to the Korean Peninsula in 1950, despite the absence of
“easily” obtainable congressional authorization).
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C. Of Corsairs and Quasi-Wars: Early Practice Under the Constitution
Full, formal declarations of war have been rare in U.S. history.68 Only five
conflicts, against a total of eleven nations, have been fought under declarations
of war passed by Congress.69 On many other occasions—a total of 124 times
according to many President-First advocates70—the President has deployed U.S.
military forces into harm’s way with something less than a declaration of war,
and often with no congressional authorization at all.71
1. The Quasi-War with France
While offering some support to the President-First faction, early U.S. war
powers precedent illustrates that the recent executive practice of seeking
congressional authorization—short of a declaration of war—for limited conflicts
is by no means solely a late twentieth and early twenty-first century
phenomenon.72 America’s first major armed conflict under the Constitution, the
so-called Quasi-War with France from 1798–1800, is instructive.73
In 1798, President John Adams, in response to a campaign of maritime
harassment of American shipping by French privateers and the failure of a
68. Official Declarations of War by Congress, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/
pagelayout/history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/WarDeclarationsbyCongress.htm (last visited
Aug. 13, 2014); see also JENNIFER K. ELSEA & RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, DECLARATIONS OF WAR
AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR MILITARY FORCES 6–8 (2009).
69. Official Declarations of War by Congress, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/
pagelayout/history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/WarDeclarationsbyCongress.htm (last visited
Aug. 13, 2014); see also ELSEA & GRIMMETT, supra note 68, at 6–8.
70. See YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 60, at 12. This number has been
cited in executive branch opinions from Vietnam onwards, including: Leonard C. Meeker, The
Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam, 54 DEP’T ST. BULL. 474, 484
(1966); Proposed Deployment of United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 19 OP.
O.L.C. 327, 331 (1995); The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations
Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them, 25 OP. O.L.C. 188, 202 (2001). A similar
document prepared to justify the Korean War listed eighty-five such military operations. Authority
of the President To Repel the Attack in Korea, 23 DEP’T ST. BULL. 173, 177–78 (1950). During
the Korean War, Professor Edward S. Corwin, a critic of the President-First approach, dismissively
referred to most of these uses of military force as “involv[ing] fights with pirates, landings of small
naval contingents on barbarous or semi-barbarous coasts, the dispatch of small bodies of troops to
chase bandits or cattle rustlers across the Mexican border, and the like.” Edward S. Corwin, The
President’s Power, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 29, 1951, at 16.
71. Corwin, supra note 70, at 16.
72. See YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 60, at 177 (stating that “[f]or
much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Congress assented to presidential uses of
force abroad”; although, such instances were usually “small-scale actions to protect American
property, citizens, or honor abroad that had little risk of significant combat”).
73. The “Quasi-War” was a “limited war” between the United States and France that was the
“first armed conflict that Americans, as citizens of an independent nation, fought.” See
ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE UNDECLARED
WAR WITH FRANCE 1797–1801 vii (1966).

2015]

Keeping War Out of the Zone of Twilight

1017

diplomatic mission to Paris the previous year,74 recommended that Congress
authorize the Executive with certain war powers to appropriately provide
protection for U.S. commercial ships abroad.75 Congress passed a series of
authorizations that would allow the fledgling naval establishment, under the
newly established Department of the Navy,76 to pursue a limited war against
French naval and merchant ships.77 Through this legislation, Congress
authorized the Executive to engage in armed conflict, but also placed meaningful
limitations on how that conflict could be waged.78
Out of the Quasi-War came three early Supreme Court cases that, from a
Congress-First perspective, further defined the scope of congressional power to

74. See id. at 9–10. The circumstances surrounding the failed diplomatic efforts are known
as the “XYZ Affair.” See id. at 36–37, 58–59.
75. See ELSEA & GRIMMETT, supra note 68, at 9. President Adams considered requesting
Congress to formally declare war, and many members of his own Federalist Party wished for one,
believing it would cement their domestic political advantage. DECONDE, supra note 73, at 104.
However, President Adams ultimately decided against seeking a formal declaration because the
Federalists were divided on the issue and he feared that a general war with France could lead to
invasion by the powerful French Army. See id.; Gregory E. Fehlings, America’s First Limited War,
53 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 102, 111–12 (2000).
76. In April 1798, Congress established the Department of the Navy to assume control of the
three frigates that had been built under the auspices of the War Department the year before as well
as to acquire and outfit other vessels in order to establish a Navy; in addition, the Treasury
Department had available for action a small flotilla of revenue cutters (later known as the Revenue
Cutter Service, a predecessor service of the U.S. Coast Guard). See The Reestablishment of the
Navy, 1787–1801, Historical Overview and Select Bibliography, NAVAL HIST. CTR., http://
www.history.navy.mil/biblio/biblio4/biblio4a.htm (last visited June 17, 2015); Teaching with
Documents: Launching the New U.S. Navy, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/education/
lessons/new-us-navy/navy-bill.html (last visited June 17, 2015).
77. The first such authorization came in May of 1798, targeting armed French vessels “on and
near the Coasts,” as well as authorizing U.S. naval vessels to seize the ships and bring them into
U.S. ports. An Act More Effectually to Protect the Commerce and Coasts of the United States, ch.
48, 1 Stat. 561 (1798). A month later, another Act was passed which laid out policies and
procedures to regulate the “forfeiture and condemnation” of such property seized. An Act in
Addition to the Act More Effectually to Protect the Commerce and Coasts of the United States, ch.
62, § 1, 1 Stat. 574 (1798). Two days after the United States abrogated all treaties with France, on
July 9, 1798, DECONDE, supra note 73, at 344, Congress authorized the President to order naval
vessels to attack and capture “any armed French vessel, which shall be found within the
jurisdictional limits of the United States, or elsewhere, on the high seas[,]” and authorized the
President to issue letters of marque to private armed vessels. An Act Further to Protect the
Commerce of the United States, ch. 68, § 1, 1–2, Stat. 578 (1798). The following year, Congress
passed further legislation that authorized the executive branch to stop, search and seize any U.S.
ship engaging in commerce with France. An Act Further to Suspend the Commercial Intercourse
between the United States and France, and the Dependencies Thereof, ch. 2, § 5, 1 Stat. 613 (1799).
78. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb
— A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 967–72 (2008) (discussing the implications
of congressional limitations on executive war-fighting in the Quasi-War).
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authorize military action.79 First, in 1800 the Supreme Court in Bas v. Tingy,80
following a dispute over salvage rights for a ship recaptured from France, was
asked to decide whether France should be considered an “enemy” for purposes
of a March 2, 1799 general law that created a system of regulating the recapture
of ships and materiel from the “enemy.”81 The Court, delivering its opinions
seriatim, came to a unanimous conclusion that France was considered the
“enemy” of the United States during this time.82 Justice Bushrod Washington
argued that, even though war had not been “declared in form” and was “limited
as to places, persons, and things,” the two nations should be considered enemies
because Congress had taken several steps towards war and conflict had been
“authori[z]ed by the legitimate authority of the two governments.”83 Justice
Samuel Chase agreed, stating that “Congress is empowered to declare a general
war, or [C]ongress may wage a limited war; limited in place, in objects, and in
time.”84 The Justice found that in this case, “Congress has not declared war in
general terms; but [C]ongress has authori[z]ed hostilities on the high seas by
certain persons in certain cases.”85
The following year, the Court was called upon in Talbot v. Seeman86 to decide
as a preliminary question whether Congress “may declare a general war, or a
partial war.” 87 Newly minted Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, drew
on the precedent established in Bas and reached the conclusion that the “situation
of this country with regard to France, was that of a partial and limited war.”88
Finally, in Little v. Barreme,89 Chief Justice Marshall found that the President
79. See, e.g., id. at 954–55, 967–68 (discussing Little v. Barreme and Bas v. Tingy).
80. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
81. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Quasi War Cases—and Their Relevance to Whether “Letters
of Marque and Reprisal” Constrain Presidential War Powers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465,
483–86 (2005); see also An Act for the Government of the Navy of the United States, ch. 24, 1
Stat. 709 (1799) (establishing general principles for the regulation of the Navy). The major dispute
in Bas was whether this law superseded an earlier law, An Act in Addition to the Act More
Effectually to Protect the Commerce and Coasts of the United States, ch. 62, §2, 1 Stat. 574 (1798),
that had established less generous salvage rights. Sidak, supra at 483.
82. See Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 39–40 (Moore, J.), 44–45 (Chase, J.), 45–46 (Patterson, J.);
see also Sidak, supra note 81, at 483–86.
83. Bas, 4 U.S. at 40, 43 (Washington, J.); see also Charles A. Lofgrent, War-Making Under
the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 701 (1972) (stating that Bas stood
for the proposition that “whether hostilities were declared or undeclared, they still constituted
war—being perfect and general war in the one case, and imperfect and limited war in the other”).
84. Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 43 (Chase, J.).
85. Id.
86. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).
87. Id. at 8–9. The Court concluded that the ship Amelia, a German merchant vessel from the
city of Hamburg that had first been captured by the French before being subsequently captured by
Americans, was lawfully seized under U.S. law and the law of nations. See id. at 9–10.
88. Id. at 9.
89. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
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had gone beyond his executive authority by ordering U.S. naval vessels to seize
merchant vessels appearing to be of neutral nations but in which there is a “just
suspicion” that the vessels are actually American.90
Though some scholars have argued that these cases say far less about the war
powers than Congress-First advocates read into them,91 the cases represent
helpful tools that assist legal scholars in discerning how the first generation of
justices under the Constitution worked through these issues.92
2. The First Barbary War
Congress played a similar role during the First Barbary War, a conflict
between the United States and privateers of the Barbary States in North Africa
who made their living harassing European and American shipping in the
Mediterranean.93 President Thomas Jefferson, upon taking office, sought to
avoid the previous U.S. practice of paying these Barbary corsairs hefty
ransoms.94
Just prior to Jefferson’s inauguration in March 1801, Yusuf Karamanli, the
Pasha of Tripoli, stepped up his attacks on American shipping, demanded an
increase in tribute, and in May, declared war on the United States.95 Around the
same time, President Jefferson, still unaware of the Tripolitan declaration of war,

90. See id. at 179 (“I acquiesce in that of my brethren, which is, that the instructions cannot
change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which without those instructions would have
been a plain trespass.”). The statute at question in this case was: An Act to Further Suspend the
Commercial Intercourse between the United States and France, and the Dependencies Thereof, ch.
2, § 5, 1 Stat. 613 (1799).
91. See, e.g., Sidak, supra note 81, at 483–86 (noting in particular that “Bas was a case of
statutory construction, not constitutional interpretation,” and that “[s]aying that Congress has the
power to authorize limited war does not necessarily imply that it holds that power exclusively”);
see also Katharine A. Wagner, Little v. Barreme: The Little Case Caught in the Middle of A Big
War Powers Debate, 10 WAYNE ST. J. L. IN SOC’Y 77, 78 (2008) (“For some, Little has risen to
mythological status . . . while others consider Little as no more than urban legend, extended far
beyond its meager beginning as a common-place—for 1799—ship seizure claim.”) (footnote
omitted).
92. Not only were all of the justices sitting during this period contemporaries of the Framers,
but Justice William Patterson had been a member of the Constitutional Convention, and Justice
Samuel Chase had signed the Declaration of Independence. See ROBERT K. WRIGHT, JR. &
MORRIS J. MACGREGOR, JR., SOLDIER-STATESMEN OF THE CONSTITUTION 166 (1987), http://
www.history.army.mil/books/RevWar/ss/ss-fm.htm; Samuel Chase, SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y, http://
www.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-court/associate-justices/samuel-chase-1796-1811/.
93. See Alex J. Whitman, From the Shores of Tripoli to the Deserts of Iraq: Congress and the
President in Offensive and Defensive Wars, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1363, 1374 (2011).
94. See id.
95. Arthur H. Garrison, The History of Executive Branch Legal Opinions on the Power of the
President as Commander-in-Chief from Washington to Obama, 43 CUMB. L. REV. 375, 385 (2013).
Tripoli did not execute a legal document declaring war, but rather manifested its declaration by
cutting down the flagstaff in front of the U.S. consulate in Tripoli, as was its custom. Id.
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met with his cabinet to discuss sending a naval force to confront Karamanli.96
According to the notes of the cabinet meeting held on May 15, 1801, the majority
of the cabinet argued that if the commander of the naval squadron were to
determine that a state of war existed between the United States and any of the
Barbary States, he may “search for & destroy the enemy’s vessels wherever they
can find them[.]”97 Only Attorney General Levi Lincoln argued that, in the
absence of a declaration of war, “[o]ur men of war may repel an attack on
individual vessels, but after the repulse, may not proceed to destroy the enemy’s
vessels generally.”98 After consulting his cabinet, and prior to congressional
consent, President Jefferson elected to send a naval force to the Mediterranean
“to protect American shipping but not to offensively engage the Tripolitan Navy
unless he were to find upon arrival that a state of war had been declared.”99
Jefferson’s actions can be examined both from Congress-First and PresidentFirst perspectives.100 From a Congress-First perspective, President Jefferson’s
decision to order his naval commander to serve only as a protective force and
not to engage in offensive actions symbolizes executive restraint in the absence
of congressional approval in response to a real threat.101 The behavior of the
U.S. schooner Enterprise in August 1801, which merely disarmed and released,
rather than destroyed, the Tripolitan cruiser Tripoli serves to illustrate executive
restraint corresponding to these orders.102 President Jefferson, in a “famous
statement of deference to Congress’ power,” explained the release of the
Tripolitan cruiser in his first annual Message to Congress, asserting that such an
offensive act would be “[u]nauthorized by the constitution, without the sanction
of Congress, [as it would] go beyond the line of defen[s]e, the vessel being
disabled from committing further hostilities, was liberated with its crew.”103
However, looking at these events in a different light, President Jefferson’s
actions may also support the President-First position. Scholars have advanced
the argument that by ordering Commodore Dale to advance into the
Mediterranean Sea, the President anticipated an aggressive response from hostile
forces.104 This action necessitated a congressional response and thereby justifed

96. See id. at 385–86.
97. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on a Cabinet Meeting (May 15, 1801) (on file with Founders
Online, National Archives), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-34-02-0088.
98. Id.; see Garrison, supra note 95, at 387.
99. See id. at 386–87 (“[I]f war was declared, [the U.S. naval commander] was ordered to
‘chastise’ the Tripolitan Navy ‘wherever you shall find them.’”); Whitman, supra note 93, at 1376.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 101–08.
101. See Whitman, supra note 93, at 1375–77.
102. See id.; see also Adler, supra note 46, at 18–19.
103. See John Yoo, Jefferson and Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 421, 433 (2008) (quoting
President Thomas Jefferson, President’s Message (Dec. 8, 1801), in 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 11, 12
(1801)).
104. See infra note 107.
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his order, once a declaration of war had been declared, to “protect our commerce
& chastise their insolence—by sinking, burning, or destroying their ships &
Vessels wherever you shall find them.”105 Supporting this inference of
presidential sleight-of-hand, Abraham Sofaer, a law professor who later served
as a U.S. District Court Judge and State Department Legal Adviser in the Reagan
Administration,106 argues that President Jefferson was not forthright in his
December address to Congress by neglecting to fully inform Congress of the
circumstances involving the encounter between Enterprise and Tripoli.107
Sofaer points to evidence that President Jefferson omitted “material
information” from his address to Congress; specifically, that “the cabinet had
authorized offensive actions, and Dale had been instructed accordingly. [The
Enterprise] had released the [Tripoli] only because [the Enterprise] was on [its]
way to Malta, rather than on [its] way back,” not because the President was
exercising restraint in the absence of congressional assent.108
Soon thereafter, Congress passed legislation granting the President authority
to engage in hostilities against Tripoli.109 Unlike the series of narrow

105. See Samuel Smith to Commodore Richard Dale (May 20, 1801), in 1 NAVAL
DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE UNITED STATES WARS WITH THE BARBARY POWERS 465, 469
(1939).
106. See Abraham D. Sofaer, HOOVER INST., http://www.hoover.org/profiles/abraham-dsofaer (last visited May 25, 2015).
107. See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Presidency, War, and Foreign Affairs: Practice Under the
Framers, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 12, 25–27 (1976). Sofaer, at the time a Professor of Law
at Columbia University, argued that the only reason that the Enterprise did not capture the
Tripolitan ship was that Commodore Dale sent Enterprise, serving as a tender for the larger frigates,
to Malta for water; in fact, Commodore Dale’s specific orders to Lieutenant Andrew Sterett,
commanding officer of Enterprise, were to defeat, disable, and leave any Tripolitan corsairs he
encountered on his way to Malta, but defeat and capture any such corsairs he encountered on his
way back from Malta to the waters off Tripoli. See id.; see also Richard Dale to Andrew Sterett
(July 30, 1801), in 1 NAVAL DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE UNITED STATES WARS WITH THE
BARBARY POWERS 534–35 (1939). Jon Meachem, author of a recent popular biography on
Jefferson, Jill Abramson, Grand Bargainer N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/11/11/books/review/thomas-jefferson-the-art-of-power-by-jon-meacham.html?_r=0, agrees
with this characterization, writing “[h]ere Jefferson was effectively exerting control over military
and foreign policy while appearing to defer to the legislature. It was typical Jefferson: having his
way without precipitating confrontation or a distracting crisis.” JON MEACHAM, THOMAS
JEFFERSON: THE ART OF POWER 365 (2012); but see LOUIS FISHER, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS:
THE BARBARY WARS: LEGAL PRECEDENT FOR INVADING HAITI? (1994), http://www.loufisher.
org/docs/wp/barbary.pdf (noting that Jefferson, after issuing orders to Dale authorizing him to
attack Barbary ships, said “[t]he real alternative before us is whether to abandon the Mediterranean
or to keep up a cruise in it. . . . [T]his Congress must decide.”) (quoting 8 The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson 63–64 (Ford ed. 1897)).
108. See Sofaer, supra note 107, at 25–26.
109. See An Act for the Protection of the Commerce and Seamen of the United States, Against
the Tripolitan Cruisers, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 129 (1802).
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authorizations passed by Congress in the Quasi-War,110 this authorization was
broadly worded, allowing the President to seize any property of Tripoli whether
at sea or on land, and “to cause to be done all such other acts of precaution or
hostility, as the state of war will justify, and may in [the President’s] opinion
require.”111 With this authorization, President Jefferson was then free to commit
forces to engage in offensive action against Tripoli.112 It seems, then, that both
the Quasi-War and the Barbary Wars stand not only for the proposition that the
President must obtain authorization from Congress to engage in significant
armed conflicts, but also that the President has some freedom to dispatch forces
short of the onset of hostilities.113
In fact, some prominent scholars and practitioners argue that the early
precedent shows a more complicated reality.114 Eugene Rostow, Dean of Yale
Law School and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs under President
Lyndon B. Johnson,115 argued that the war powers arrangement was not a bipolar
decision between receiving authorization from Congress on one hand and the
President acting completely on his or her own on the other.116 In fact, Dean
Rostow noted that in this early period of American history, “Presidents and
Congress alike found that the exigencies of diplomacy in a world at war required
many uses and threats to use military power which defied simplified

110. See supra Part I.C.1.
111. See An Act for the Protection of the Commerce and Seamen of the United States, Against
the Tripolitan Cruisers, ch. 4, § 2, 2 Stat. 129 (1802). Sofaer compared this to the authorization for
military force in Vietnam: “the authorization concerning Tripoli was surely as broad and as vague
as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, passed after questionable executive representations in 1964.”
Sofaer, supra note 107, at 27.
112. This would include an elaborate plot to depose Yusuf Karamanli as Pasha and replace him
with his brother Hamet. See supra note 107, at 27–29.
113. See Whitman, supra note 93, at 1407 (noting that while “the rhetoric and the actions of
the Framers, exemplified during the Barbary Wars reflect a distinct desire for Congress to play a
central role in the decision to go to war,” this role is reduced as “undeclared war, whether offensive
or defensive” has become more common).
114. See infra text accompanying notes 115–17.
115. See Todd S. Purdum, Eugene Rostow, 89, Official at State Dept. and Law Dean, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 26, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/26/us/eugene-rostow-89-official-atstate-dept-and-law-dean.html. Though Dean Rostow’s views could fairly be considered to be in
the President-First camp, he also saw a greater role for Congress than others, particularly Professor
Yoo. See Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEX. L. REV.
833, 851 (1972) (“It is tempting, but would be incorrect, to suggest . . . that the constitutional
allocation of power between President and Congress with respect to the use of the armed forces
corresponds to the categories of international law, with the President authorized to use the armed
forces as head of state and commander-in-chief . . . while only Congress could move the nation into
the juridical world of a state of war. . . . The constitutional pattern is . . . more complex.”); see also
Barrett, supra note 57 (discussing John Yoo’s views favoring very broad Executive war-making
powers).
116. Rostow, supra note 115, at 851.
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classification,” and that the “invocation of force as a tool of national policy
ranged from the purely Presidential to the full declaration of war.”117
D. Post World War II Expansion of Executive Power
Still, the general American practice up until 1950 was that major conflicts
against foreign nations were fought under either a declaration of war or upon
congressional authorization; while reprisals, punitive expeditions, protection of
U.S. citizens or commerce on foreign shores, and other such relatively minor
military actions could be waged by the President acting alone.118 President
Truman made a clean break with this precedent by deciding not to seek
congressional authorization for U.S. military action in the Korean peninsula.119
1. The “Police Action” in Korea: A New Precedent
On June 25, 1950, forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK) streamed across the thirty-eighth parallel, invading the Republic of
Korea (ROK) and catching the southern nation’s army (and the small cadre of
U.S. advisors there) completely unprepared.120 President Truman and his
national security team quickly convened and determined that immediate military
involvement would be necessary.121 Two days after this determination,
President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson met with congressional
leaders to discuss the situation in Korea.122 When Republican Senator
Alexander Smith asked President Truman whether he would seek congressional
authorization for war in Korea, the President answered that he would “take it
under advisement.”123

117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Bracknell, supra note 51, at 221 (“To wit, the ‘supergeneral’ power [of the
President to deploy military forces without Congressional involvement] has been exercised well
over 200 times in the history of the republic absent any legislative expression of approval of
exercise of the war power. Obviously scores of uses of the armed forces would have been plainly
inappropriate for a declaration of war . . . .”); see also supra text accompanying note 68; Corwin,
supra note 70, at 16.
119. BAKER, supra note 5, at 17.
120. DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE COLDEST WINTER: AMERICA AND THE KOREAN WAR 1
(2007).
121. See id. at 93–94. Truman made the decision to fight despite an earlier speech by Secretary
of State Dean Acheson that had notably failed to include Korea in the U.S. “Asian defense
perimeter.” Id. at 48. This speech emboldened DPRK President Kim Il-Sung and convinced Soviet
Premier Joseph Stalin and Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao that the United States would
not fight for the Korean Peninsula. See id. at 48–49.
122. Id. at 99.
123. See id. Rather remarkably, Halberstam reports that until Sen. Smith asked this question,
no one in the President’s inner circle had stopped to consider whether congressional approval was
necessary or preferable. Id.
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Later that day, President Truman, Secretary Acheson, and White House
adviser Averell Harriman discussed whether to seek authorization.124 Though
Harriman vigorously argued for congressional authorization (more for domestic
political reasons than anything else), Acheson was concerned about the urgency
of the situation in Korea and the prospect of Congress slowing down the
process—a concern shared by Truman (along with his frustration at
congressional grandstanding following the “loss” of China to Communism).125
Several days later, on July 3, President Truman met with several cabinet
secretaries, Senate Majority Leader Scott Lucas of Illinois, and other top
officials of the government to consider “a recommendation by the Department
of State that the President go before Congress some time in the near future to
make a full report to a Joint Session of the Congress on the Korean situation . .
. followed by the introduction of a Joint Resolution expressing approval of the
action taken in Korea.”126 Each of the assembled officials reacted to the
proposal.127 Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews thought it “essential to
say something to the people and not to by-pass the Congress.”128 On the other
hand, Postmaster General Jesse M. Donaldson argued that if the President
approached Congress in this manner “he might be called back again and
again”;129 Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson seemed to concur with the
Postmaster General’s concerns.130 The reaction of Senator Lucas, the only
representative of the Legislative Branch in the room, was particularly striking.131
He first remarked that “the President had very properly done what he had to
without consulting the Congress,”132 and suggested a “fireside chat” with the
people, rather than addressing Congress, as an alternative.133 Senator Lucas then
stated that if the President called another meeting of congressional leaders
seeking authorization, he undoubtedly would not have any “trouble in getting it

124. Id.
125. See id.
126. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) (July 3, 1950), in 7
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1950 at 287 (1976), http://digital.library.wisc.edu/
1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1950v07.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 128–37.
128. See Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large, supra note 126, at 289.
129. Id. Note that until 1971, the Postmaster General was a member of the Cabinet and was
often a close political adviser to the President. See Peter Grier, Postmasters General, Kings of
Political Patronage?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/DC-Decoder/Decoder-Buzz/2010/0311/Postmasters-general-kings-of-political-patronage.
130. See Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large, supra note 126, at 287–
89 (suggesting “that the President wait until there were things which the public does not know and
which could then be told to them”).
131. See infra text accompanying notes 132–35.
132. See Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large, supra note 126, at 287.
133. Id. at 288.
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through.”134 However, Senator Lucas relayed to the assembled group that
“[m]any members of Congress had suggested to him that the President should
keep away from Congress and avoid debate.”135 Though Averell Harriman
reiterated his (quite prescient) concern that “[w]hile things are going well now
there may be trouble ahead[,]”136 no further action was taken on the concept of
a Joint Resolution, and the President ultimately decided not to seek
congressional authorization.137
The Truman Administration’s justification for Presidential authority without
congressional authorization rested on its characterization of the Korean conflict
as a “police action,”138 combined with an expansive reading of the Commanderin-Chief Clause and United Nations Security Council Resolution.139 The
Administration, citing numerous instances where the President had previously
sent U.S. forces to protect American lives and property as well as to execute
U.S. foreign policy, maintained that the President could send the Armed Forces
around the world without specific authorization.140 The Administration also
cited United Nations Security Council Resolutions of July 25 and 27, 1950,
which ordered North Korean forces to retreat north of the thirty-eighth parallel,
and requested that “Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to
the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to

134. Id. at 289.
135. Id. at 290.
136. Id. The near-unanimous support from Congress would be short-lived. See HALBERSTAM,
supra note 120, at 99 (“[S]oon the moment [to secure a resolution from Congress] passed, and the
political unanimity that had existed at the hour of the invasion evaporated.”); see also infra text
accompanying notes 147–49.
137. See HALBERSTAM, supra note 120, at 99.
138. When asked directly in a press conference on June 29, 1950 whether the United States
was at war, President Truman answered unequivocally “[w]e are not at war.” Harry Truman, The
President’s News Conference of June 29, 1950, http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/
document/the-presidents-news-conference-of-june-29-1950/. In the same press conference,
another reporter asked President Truman if it would be correct “to call this a police action under
the United Nations[,]” to which the President answered, “Yes. That is exactly what it amounts to.”
Id.
139. See Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea, supra note 70, at 173 (“The
President . . . has full control over the use [of the armed forces] . . . [and] has [the] authority to
conduct the foreign relations of the United States. . . . Both traditional international law and article
39 of the United Nations Charter and the resolution pursuant thereto authorize the United States to
repel the armed aggression against the Republic of Korea.”).
140. Id. The examples included minor U.S. interventions in Japan in the 1860s, what today
might be called peacekeeping efforts in Samoa in 1889, and the U.S. Marines’ involvement in the
Boxer Rebellion of 1900–1901. Id. at 175. While these examples do not, of course, come close to
the scope of efforts in Korea, by October, 1950, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was
promising that American troops would be “home by Christmas,” so it is possible those precedents
seemed reasonable at the time without the benefit of hindsight. See HALBERSTAM, supra note 120,
at 23.
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restore international peace and security in the area.”141 Later, the Administration
also argued that Congress’s expansion of the draft, passed on July 30, 1950, as
well as special appropriations to fund the war, amounted to de facto
congressional approval of the war.142
On the other hand, Professor John Hart Ely, a prominent Congress-first
proponent, perceived the invasion of Korea without congressional authorization
to be a “shatter[ing]” of the “long-standing legislative-executive consensus”
model wherein congressional authorization of military action was the norm.143
Even if time were a factor in the swift response to the deteriorating situation on
the Korean Peninsula, Professor Ely states, the Truman Administration could
have likely obtained contemporaneous approval from Congress as it was surging
forces into the area, or at least cited Article II authority justifying the initial
response to the North Korean attack before seeking congressional approval as
soon as possible.144
Regardless of his personal options, President Truman’s decision to greatly
expand executive authority with respect to taking the nation to war gave his
successors a powerful tool for exercising executive war-making capabilities.145

141. See Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea, supra note 70, at 176; see
also S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (June 27, 1950) (authorizing United Nations member states to
render military aid to the Republic of Korea); S.C. Res. 82, U.N. Doc. S/1501 (June 25, 1950)
(calling for the “immediate cessation of hostilities” and the withdrawal of North Korean forces
from the thirty-eighth parallel). However, the resolutions did not mandate the use of military force.
See S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (June 27, 1950) (“Recommend[ing]” that member states
“furnish such assistance . . . as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore
international peace and security in the area”).
142. See Selective Service Extension Act of 1950, H.R. 6826, 81st Cong. (1950); STEPHEN
DAGGETT, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: MILITARY OPERATIONS: PRECEDENTS FOR FUNDING
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN REGULAR OR IN SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS BILLS 3–4
(2006), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22455.pdf (listing various military appropriations during
the Korean War); ELY, supra note 46, at 153 n.66.
143. ELY, supra note 46, at 10.
144. See, e.g., id. at 151 n.59 (noting that “there seems to have been time to secure
authorization prior to the commencement of [the U.S.] military response—for one thing Congress
was in session—the failure to do so representing a deliberate assertion of presidential prerogative”).
145. See infra Parts I.D.2, I.E. Although some Presidents have chosen to seek congressional
authorization for military deployments, the specter of unilateral executive action in taking the
nation to war looms large over the public debate. See, e.g., RYAN C. HENDRICKSON, THE CLINTON
WARS: THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS, AND WAR POWERS 43 (2002) (noting how, on the issue
of intervention in Haiti, “in remarkable fashion, Congress chose to defer to [President Clinton]”);
JOHN LEHMAN, MAKING WAR: THE 200-YEAR OLD BATTLE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS OVER HOW AMERICA GOES TO WAR 36 (1992) (discussing apprehension over whether
Congress and the American people would be receptive to engagement in the First Gulf War);
Matthew E. Vigeant, Unforeseen Consequences: The Constitutionality of Unilateral Executive R2P
Deployments and the Need for Congressional and Judicial Involvement, 47 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 209, 210–12 (2013) (discussing President Obama’s use of force against Colonel Moammar
Gadhafi’s regime in Libya absent congressional authorization); Jim Acosta & Jeremy Diamond,
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It is fair to say that there was some sentiment within the Truman Administration
to seek congressional authorization, if only in a pro forma fashion; after all, there
would not have been a July 3 meeting if the State Department had not proposed
a Presidential speech before a Joint Session of Congress followed by a Joint
Resolution.146 In addition, it is likely that Senator Lucas’s comments at the July
3 meeting, in which he demonstrated “congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence,”147 was a factor in President Truman abandoning any potential plans
to go to Congress for formal authorization.148 This choice was costly politically,
as noted by Halberstam: “As the war became more difficult than originally
imagined, the politics of it became more difficult as well, and the support began
to fragment. Because Truman had not tried for congressional support, the
opposition was off the hook in terms of accepting any responsibility for
America’s response.”149
2. Vietnam
Ironically, the war in Vietnam, which provoked a tremendous amount of
controversy and sparked several legal challenges,150 stands on much firmer legal

Obama ISIS Fight Request Sent to Congress, CNN (Feb. 12, 2015, 10:18 AM), http://www.cnn.
com/2015/02/11/politics/isis-aumf-white-house-congress/ (discussing President Obama’s request
that Congress authorize military action in Syria); Jack Goldsmith, Blaming (or Crediting) the
Lawyers for Our Syria Policy, LAWFARE (July 15, 2013, 10:38 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/
2013/07/blaming-or-crediting-the-lawyers-for-our-syria-policy/ (discussing President Obama’s
oscillating policy on seeking legal bases for foreign military intervention); Michelle M. Stein,
Senate Delays Libya ‘War Powers’ Vote, UPI (July 5, 2011), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/
Special/2011/07/05/Senate-delays-Libya-war-powers-vote/UPI-49421309903544/ (discussing a
resolution sponsored by Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., authorizing President Obama’s use of force in
Libya).
146. See Memorandum of Conversation by the Ambassador at Large, supra note 126, at 287
(noting that Secretary Acheson proclaimed that “the purpose of the meeting was to lay before the
President and his advisors a recommendation by the Department of State that the President go
before Congress some time in the near future to make a full report to a Joint Session of the Congress
on the Korean situation”).
147. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); see also supra notes 131–35.
148. See Memorandum of Conversation by the Ambassador at Large, supra note 126, at 289–
90 (discussing Senator Lucas’s apparent lack of urgency in seeking that President Truman ask for
congressional authorization).
149. HALBERSTAM, supra note 120, at 99.
150. In Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971), two servicemen attempted to enjoin
the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and their commanding officers from deploying
them to Vietnam on the grounds that the officers “exceeded their constitutional authority by
ordering them to participate in a war not properly authorized by Congress.” Id. at 1040. In
Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971), servicemen argued that their deployment to
Vietnam was “a deprivation of liberty in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.” Id. at 28. In Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973), thirteen members of
the House of Representatives filed a complaint against the President and a number of Executive
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footing than the Korean conflict.151 In 1964, just over 20,000 American service
members were stationed in Vietnam.152 On August 2, 1964, the USS Maddox,
a destroyer engaging in a signals intelligence patrol in international waters in the
Gulf of Tonkin, was reportedly attacked by North Vietnamese patrol boats; the
Maddox and the USS Turner Joy were reportedly attacked again over the next
two days.153 In response, President Johnson ordered retaliatory airstrikes and
requested that Congress pass a resolution authorizing the President “to take all
necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United
States and to prevent further aggression.”154 The resolution, commonly referred
to as either the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution or the Southeast Asia Resolution,155
passed 416-0 in the House and 88-2 in the Senate.156
In the years following the vote on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, many of the
members of Congress who voted for it attempted to argue that the resolution did
not authorize the type of military escalation that President Johnson eventually
undertook.157 However, after reviewing the legislative history, Professor Ely
concluded that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, though vague and granting wide
discretion in the President, was nonetheless a legal authorization of war from
Congress.158 Indeed, there is ample precedent for such an expansive resolution

officers alleging that the Executive officers “unlawfully impair[ed] and defeat[ed]” their
“Constitutional right, as members of the Congress of the United States, to decide whether the United
States should fight a war.” Id. at 613.
151. See infra text accompanying notes 152–59.
152. Vietnam War Allied Troop Levels 1960–73, AM. WAR LIBR., http://www.
americanwarlibrary.com/vietnam/vwatl.htm (last visited May 25, 2015).
153. It is likely that the first attack actually occurred while the later-reported attacks did not.
See Bracknell, supra note 51, 192–93, 195 (“[I]t is at least possible that the ‘engagements’ were in
fact mere perceptions—sonar and radar ‘shadows’—generated aboard the ships merely as a result
of the chaos and confusion that reigns during armed conflict.”); Robert J. Hanyock, Skunks, Bogies,
Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2–4 August 1964, 19
CRYPTOLOGIC Q. 1, 1 (2000).
154. See The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, H.R.J. Res. 1145 (1964); see also President’s
Message to Congress (Aug. 5, 1964), https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/tonkinsp.htm.
155. See H.R.J. Res. 1145; see also David L. Larson, The Constitution and U.S. Foreign
Policy: The President, the Congress, and the People, 32 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 143, 147
(2008) (discussing common names for the resolution).
156. E.W. Kenworthy, Resolution Wins, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1964, at 1.
157. See ELY, supra note 46, at 16–17 (quoting Senator William Fulbright (D-Ark.) claiming
that he had been “unaware of the significance of the measure” and that passage of the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution “must stand as the only instance in the nation’s history in which Congress
authorized war without knowing that it was doing so”).
158. See id. at 29–30. Despite Senator Fulbright’s later protestations, when asked by Senator
Daniel Brewster (D-Md.) whether the resolution “would authorize or recommend or approve the
landing of large American armies in Vietnam or in China,” Senator Fulbright responded,
There is nothing in the resolution, as I read it, that contemplates it. I agree with the
Senator that this is the last thing we would want to do. However, the language of the
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in American history; namely, the similarities between the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution and the authorization that began Thomas Jefferson’s First Barbary
War in 1801.159
E. The War Powers Resolution Era
As the Vietnam War drew to an end, Congress responded to the perceived and
actual overreach of two successive Presidents by drafting what became known
as the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (WPR), which overcame President
Nixon’s veto in 1973.160 Under the terms of the WPR, the President must report
to Congress each time he or she directs U.S. forces into hostilities or into an area
where hostilities are imminent, where military forces are entering a country
equipped for combat, or to enter a country in numbers that substantially enlarge
U.S. forces already in-country.161 The President may employ the military in this
manner for no more than sixty days without an explicit declaration of war,
authorization of the use of the military in such a manner, or if the President
receives an extension beyond the sixty day maximum.162 In the absence of such
a declaration, approval, or extension, the President must remove military forces
within ninety days.163
Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen, a legal scholar whose attitude towards
executive war powers appears to be more consistent with the Congress-First
camp, describes the WPR as a legislative attempt to minimize, if not eliminate,
executive actions falling in the “Category II” “zone of twilight” of Justice
Jackson’s tripartite analysis in Youngstown.164 This contention is supported,
according to Professor Paulsen, by Section 8 of the WPR, which states that the
Executive shall not infer authority from “treaties, appropriations acts, or any
other legislative action or inaction short of specific authorization.”165

resolution would not prevent it. It would authorize whatever the Commander in Chief
feels is necessary.
Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 110–13.
160. War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2012). See also Andrew
Glass, Richard Nixon Vetoes War Powers Resolution, POLITICO (Oct. 24, 2013, 5:06 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/nixon-vetoes-war-powers-resolution-oct-24-1973-98747.
html (discussing Nixon’s veto and Congress’s override with respect to the War Powers Resolution).
161. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a).
162. Id. § 1544(b).
163. Id.
164. Paulsen, supra note 31, at 245–48; see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also supra Part I.A.
165. Paulsen, supra note 31, at 222 (citing War Powers Resolution of 1973 § 8(a); 50 U.S.C.
§ 1547(a) (2012) (attempting to limit the context in which the President can view acts, or lack
thereof, by Congress that may further his war-righting capability).
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1. Presidential Parsing: “Consistent with” not “Pursuant to”
Presidents since Richard Nixon have maintained that the WPR is
unconstitutional.166 Nonetheless, as of September 2012, 132 reports have been
submitted to Congress by the President consistent with the reporting
requirements enumerated in Section 4 of the WPR.167 In each instance, the
President reserves the right to question the constitutionality of the WPR by
stating he or she is submitting the report “consistent with” the WPR, rather than
“pursuant to” that law.168
In addition, since the WPR was enacted, Congress has passed several specific
statutes authorizing the President to use military force in response to significant
events.169 Such authorizations related to the use of military force in Lebanon
(1982), Iraq (1991), in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and once
more in Iraq (2002).170 During this time, the executive branch also engaged in
several instances of congressionally unauthorized combat that lasted less than
ninety days, including in Granada (1983) and Panama (1989–1990).171 Other
actions, like Haiti (1994), were authorized retroactively.172
2. Presidential Indifference: Actions Neither “Consistent with” Nor
“Pursuant to”
In the recent past, in addition to the ongoing United States-led use of force in
Iraq and Syria,173 Presidents have twice exceeded the sixty-day limit while
166. RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:
PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE 2 (2012), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33532.pdf.
167. Id. at 14 (stating that, as of September 2012, “President Ford submitted 4, President Carter
1, President Reagan 14, President George H.W. Bush 7, President Clinton 60, President George W.
Bush 39, and President Barack Obama 11”).
168. See, e.g., Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House Regarding 2012 War
Powers Resolution 6-Month Report, (June 15, 2012), on file at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2012/06/15/presidential-letter-2012-war-powers-resolution-6-month-report.
169. See, e.g., ELSEA & GRIMMETT, supra note 68, at 14 (discussing Congress’s authorization
of the use of force in Lebanon in 1983).
170. See id. at 14–20.
171. See BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CRS REPORT: INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES
ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798–2014 13 (2015).
172. See GRIMMETT, supra note 166, at 8–10. The military action in Haiti was originally
intended to be an invasion, without congressional authorization, but after a naval blockade and
successful diplomacy it became a peacekeeping mission. Id. The military action was ultimately
authorized in October of 1994, although Congress requested a timely withdrawal. Id. at 9; see also
Act of Oct. 25, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-423, § 1, 108 Stat. 4358, 4358 (1994); but see HENDRICKSON,
supra note 145, at 60 (stating that “[o]nce American troops reached Haitian soil, both the House
and the Senate passed resolutions supporting the president and the troops. At the same time, neither
chamber explicitly approved the deployment,” and “[b]oth resolutions were sufficiently vague to
gain widespread support from both parties.”).
173. This Article does not offer an overview of the current debate over the legality of President
Obama’s use of force in Iraq and Syria because of the ongoing nature of the conflict. Although the
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placing the military into active hostilities without authorization from Congress,
such as in the Kosovo region of Yugoslavia (1999) and Libya (2011).174
On March 24, 1999, President Bill Clinton announced the beginning of air
strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in
order to protect the ethnic Albanian majority in the province of Kosovo.175
Though the Senate had passed a non-binding resolution the day before that
would have authorized the President “to conduct military air operations and
missile strikes in cooperation with our NATO allies against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia,”176 the House of Representatives “took no constitutional
position” at that time.177 Two days later, the President filed a report “consistent
with” the WPR that informed Congress of military action in Yugoslavia.178
In April 1999, the House debated several pieces of legislation dealing with the
war powers question.179 The House passed a bill prohibiting the use of ground
forces in Yugoslavia180 while striking down a Senate resolution in support of the
Kosovo campaign,181 a bill that would have ordered the President to remove

President claims that the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001), covers use of force against ISIL, in February 2015 the President requested a new
Authorization to cover the campaign to defeat ISIL; as of the publication of this Comment,
Congress has not acted on the President’s request. Gabrielle Levy & Paul Shinkman, Senators Split
on Obama’s War Powers Authorization, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 11, 2015, 5:23 PM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/03/11/senators-split-on-obamas-war-powers-authoriz
ation; Scott Wong & Julian Hatten, Boehner: Obama Needs to Start Over on ISIS War Powers
Request, THE HILL (May 19, 2015, 11:05 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/242487boehner-obama-should-start-over-on-isis-war-powers-request; Milbank, supra note 8, at A2.
174. See HENDRICKSON, supra note 145, at 117 (noting that “NATO’s military operation in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was the most prolonged and intense use of force during the
Clinton presidency,” lasting “seventy-eight days”); see also Report to the House of Representatives
on United States Activities in Libya, submitted June 15, 2005, https://www.scribd.com/
fullscreen/57965200?access_key=key-1u10mi6mo7qaatybceao, at 25 (“The President is of the
view that the current U.S. military operations in Libya are consistent with the War Powers
Resolution and do not under that law require further congressional authorization, because U.S.
military operations are distinct from the kind of ‘hostilities’ contemplated by the Resolution’s 60
day termination provision.”).
175. See HENDRICKSON, supra note 145, at 129; Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on
Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
(March 26, 1999) in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: WILLIAM J.
CLINTON: 1999 460 (2000), http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus/4733243.1999.001/479?page=
root;rgn=full+text;size=100;view=image.
176. S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong., (1999) (enacted).
177. See HENDRICKSON, supra note 145, at 128–29.
178. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), supra note 175, at 460.
179. See GRIMMETT, supra note 166, at 5 (discussing the considered legislation).
180. See id.; see also H.R. 1569, 106th Cong., § 2 (1999).
181. See GRIMMETT, supra note 166, at 5; see also S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong. (1999).
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forces from the area per the WPR,182 and legislation declaring war against
Yugoslavia.183 In late April 1999, seventeen Members of Congress, led by Tom
Campbell of California, sued President Clinton, claiming that he violated the
WPR.184 While the case was pending, the sixty-day cap enumerated in the WPR
expired, placing the President, from the perspective of the Members of Congress,
in violation of the WPR.185 The judicial branch, however, refused to intervene,
dismissing the case on procedural grounds after determining that the legislators
lacked standing because the injury suffered was “not sufficiently concrete and
particularized.”186 Ultimately, the bombing campaign lasted seventy-eight
days.187
One of the most recent controversies over the war powers took place in the
same geographical area where it was first tested over two hundred years earlier
by President Jefferson.188 In early 2011, a local uprising against Libyan leader
Colonel Moammar Gadhafi prompted a multinational effort to intervene on
behalf of the rebels.189 In response, President Barack Obama committed U.S.
military forces to this effort without seeking authorization from Congress.190
The U.S. campaign started on March 19, 2011.191 While French forces fired the
first shots in imposing a United Nations no-fly zone, the United States launched
cruise missiles, provided logistical support, and carried out air combat

182. See GRIMMETT, supra note 166, at 5; see also S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong. (1999).
183. See GRIMMETT, supra note 166, at 5; see also H.R.J. Res. 44, 106th Cong. (1999).
184. See GRIMMETT, supra note 166, at 5.
185. Id. President Clinton did not request a thirty-day extension of the deployment under the
War Powers Resolution, believing the War Powers Resolution to be “constitutionally defective.”
Id.
186. Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 43 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
187. See NATO’s Role in Kosovo: Operation Allied Force, NATO, http://www.nato.int/
kosovo/all-frce.htm (last visited June 21, 2015). Some have argued that the Kosovo incident was
the death knell for the War Powers Resolution. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the
Final Destruction of the War Powers Resolution, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1149, 1152–54 (2001)
(noting that “[a]nalysis of the actual operation of the Resolution in relation to . . . various combat
operations reveals a consistent pattern of executive side-stepping,” and that “[a]s a result of . . .
Operation Allied Force, this analysis can no longer be avoided”).
188. See supra Part I.C.2.
189. See A Timeline of the Conflict in Libya, CNN (Aug. 24, 2011, 2:59 PM), http://www.cnn.
com/2011/WORLD/africa/08/18/libya.timeline/. The coalition was ultimately led by NATO and
acted in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N.
Doc. S/1973 (Mar. 19, 2011).
190. See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th
Cong., 4–5 (1st Sess. 2011) (statement of Sen. Richard Lugar, ranking member of S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations) (noting that the President “made a deliberate decision not to seek a congressional
authorization of his action, either before it commenced or during the last [three] months”).
191. Libya: French Plane Fires on Military Vehicle, BBC (Mar. 19, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/world-africa-12795971.
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missions.192 On March 21, 2011, President Obama sent a letter to Congress
reporting the U.S. engagement in hostilities and further representing that his
actions were consistent with the WPR.193
In June 2011, House Speaker John Boehner wrote a letter to President Obama,
noting that unless hostile involvement of U.S. forces in Libya ceased, the
President would soon be in violation of the WPR ninety-day limit.194 In
response, President Obama first asserted that he, in fact, believed the WPR to be
constitutional—a viewpoint not shared among his predecessors—and second,
that he felt that the “constrained and supporting role in a multinational coalition”
that the United States was playing in Libya was not the kind of situation the
WPR was meant to address.195 At a hearing held on June 28, 2011, Harold Koh,
Legal Adviser of the Department of State, supported the President’s position,
arguing that U.S. involvement in Libya did not constitute “hostilities” within the
meaning of the WPR.196 Koh urged that an “unusual confluence” of limitations
allowed the Libyan mission because the conflict was “limited in mission, limited
in exposure, limited in risk of escalation, and limited in choice of military
means.”197 Though a group of Congressmen again sued to enforce the WPR, it
was similarly unsuccessful on standing grounds.198

192. Id.
193. President Barack Obama, Letter from the President Regarding the Commencement of
Operations in Libya to the Speaker of the House (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2011/03/21/letter-president-regarding-commencement-operations-libya.
194. Letter from John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House, to Barack Obama, President of the
United States (June 14, 2011), http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/speaker-boehner-challengespresident-obama-legal-justification-continued-operations. Pursuant to the War Powers Resolution,
the President, after the sixty-day period expires, has an additional thirty days to remove forces from
the country in which they are engaged. See 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2012).
195. See Report to the House of Representatives on United States Activities in Libya, submitted
June 15, 2005, https://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/57965200?access_key=key-1u10mi6mo7qaaty
bceao, at 25.
196. Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong.,
9–10 (1st Sess. 2011) (statement of Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State). Koh
particularly emphasized the fact that the United States had played a supporting role, mostly in
intelligence and refueling support, throughout the duration of the operation and that, by June,
nations other than the United States were flying ninety percent of the strike sorties. Id.
197. Id.
198. Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 125 (D.D.C. 2011). In addition to the judicial
branch’s refusal to serve as a referee in war powers disputes arising under the WPR, Congress lost
a key tool in enforcing the limits of the WPR when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
INS v. Chadha. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957–58 (1983). The Court held that the
congressional practice of one-chamber “legislative vetoes” to invalidate federal administrative
agency action was unconstitutional under the Constitution’s Presentment Clauses. Id.; see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2–3. Although this decision does not directly invalidate any part of the WPR,
it is generally thought among legal academics that the Chadha opinion preempts any congressional
attempt to invoke WPR Section 5(c), which allowed Congress to compel the President to remove
forces from the battlefield by passing a concurrent resolution. See BAKER, supra note 5, at 23
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II. “REPEALING AND REPLACING” THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
A. The War Powers Resolution Has Failed
It has become increasingly clear from both the President-centric and
Congress-centric perspectives that the WPR is not functioning as intended.199
From a Congress-First perspective, the law provides the Executive far too much
authority, “arguably invit[ing] Presidents to wage any military campaign they
wish for up to [ninety] days.”200 From a President-First perspective, the
limitations placed on the Executive in carrying out the war powers are
unconstitutional, unduly restrictive, and unresponsive to modern national
security concerns.201 Further, legal scholars in both camps have acknowledged
that the reporting requirements are both unnecessarily onerous to the President
and not particularly helpful to Congress.202 Moreover, what was originally seen
as the WPR’s main enforcement mechanism—Congress’s ability under Section
5(c) to remove forces from the battlefield by passage of a concurrent
resolution—is largely understood to be unconstitutional under the Constitution’s
Presentment Clauses.203
Most significantly, the WPR has not succeeded in preventing conflicts housed
in Justice Jackson’s “zone of twilight” category.204 Though there are notable
instances where the President has sought congressional authorization to conduct

(“Constitutional scholars generally agree that Section 5(c) of the Resolution is unconstitutional in
light of [Chadha] . . . .”); Martin Wald, Note: The Future of the War Powers Resolution, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 1407, 1408–09 (1984) (“The provision for ‘congressional veto’ of presidential actions by
concurrent resolution is typical of many of the measures enacted to control the executive . . . . [b]ut
. . . Chadha[] made it clear that virtually all such congressional vetoes are unconstitutional.”)
(footnotes omitted).
199. See infra text accompanying notes 200–18.
200. BAKER, supra note 5, at 21 (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 21, 23. Indeed, in a number of conflicts, such as in Grenada, Yugoslavia, and Haiti,
Presidents have deployed military forces absent the declaration of war, statutory authorization, or
national emergency spurred by an attack on the U.S. as outlined in Section 2(c) of the WPR. Id.;
see also 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2012) (laying out the constitutional uses of the President’s
commander-in-chief power).
202. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 5, at 23–24 (stating that “[e]xperts [have said] . . . that the
general, ongoing reporting requirements in Section 4(c) [of the WPR] have devolved into tedious
paperwork obligations,” that the reports “hardly [prove] useful,” and are “widely considered a
waste of time”). Further, as A.B. Culvahouse, White House Counsel under President Reagan,
stated, “[t]here’s a real Kabuki dance that’s done here. You send a notice up to the Hill while
protesting all the time that you’re not really providing notice and that it’s all unconstitutional.” Id.
at 24.
203. See id. at 23 (stating that the consensus among constitutional scholars is that Section 5(c)
is unconstitutional under Chadha, as both the House of Representatives and the Senate must
approve a bill prior to sending it to the President); supra note 198.
204. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); see also supra Part I.A.
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military operations per the WPR, more often Presidents have acted in the
absence of such authorization.205 Additionally, in several of these instances, the
President acted not to “repel sudden attacks,” in James Madison’s words,206 but
for a myriad of reasons beyond the direct defense of the United States, its
citizens, or its installations overseas.207 Indeed, despite President Obama’s
avowed willingness to scale back executive authority, some have argued that he
has become an ardent practitioner of unilateral warfare.208
Furthermore, the WPR has failed to definitively prevent the President from
justifying his or her actions upon the inference of support from war
appropriations or other similar actions.209 The executive branch continues to
cite these actions in its legal justifications of armed conflict, despite the explicit
words of Section 8(a) of the WPR.210

205. See supra text accompanying notes 167–71.
206. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 47, at 318.
207. For example, while President Clinton’s rationale for U.S. airstrikes in Kosovo—the
protection of the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo from cleansing by the Yugoslav
government—was certainly a noble and laudable goal, this goal was far afield from the Madisonian
concept of defending against “sudden attacks” and the pre-Korea precedent of unilateral executive
action only in protection of clear American interests. See supra note 51 and accompanying text;
Peter Baker, Obama’s Dual View of War Power Seeks Limits and Leeway, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
11, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/12/us/obama-war-authorization-congress.html?_r=0
(noting that Presidents such as Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson, Bill Clinton, George H.W.
Bush, and George W. Bush have, for a variety of reasons other than direct defense of the United
States, engaged in warfare without acknowledging a need for congressional approval); see also Jeff
Pierce, Lecturer Says Obama Bypassed War Powers Resolution for Libya Conflict, THE SOUTH
END: WAYNE ST. UNIV., (Oct. 20, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.thesouthend.wayne.edu/archives/
article_5929146a-cdab-5c9d-a25a-19fe3fae8dc8.html (noting that there have been more than two
hundred instances where Presidents have acted to deploy military forces without congressional
authorization).
208. See Jack Goldsmith & Matthew Waxman, Obama, Not Bush, is the Master of Unilateral
War, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 14, 2014) http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119827/obamaswar-powers-legacy-he-must-seek-congressional-authorization (contrasting President Obama’s
“broad theory of unilateral war powers” with his “lofty rhetoric about principle”).
209. See War Powers Resolution of 1973 § 8(a)(1), 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1) (2012); see also
supra text accompanying notes 167–72.
210. See, e.g., Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Attorney Gen., to the Attorney
Gen., “Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo” (Dec. 19, 2000), http://www.
lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Memorandum-from-Randolph-D.-Moss-AssistantAttorney-General-to-the-Attorney-General-ʺAuthorization-for-Continuing-Hostilities-in-Kosov
oʺ-Dec.-19-20001.pdf (stating that “[p]rior to the enactment of the WPR, many enactments of
Congress, especially appropriations measures, could justifiably have been regarded by the
Executive as constituting implied authority to continue the deployment of our armed forces in
hostilities”) (quoting Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General: Overview of the War Powers
Resolution, 8 Op. O.L.C., 271, 273 n.4 (1984)).
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Moreover, the blurred constitutionality of certain sections of the WPR has led
Presidents to either minimize it or ignore it completely.211 Even though
President Obama, contrary to his predecessors, nominally supports the
constitutionality of the WPR, his administration has minimized the WPR by
narrowing its scope considerably.212
At the same time, Congress deserves a large portion of the blame for the
WPR’s ineffectiveness.213 Rather than working to support the institution of
Congress and its role in checking executive authority with respect to the war
powers, Congress often neglects to partake in the high-stakes and politicallyfraught process of sending the nation to war214 (just as Senator Lucas did at the
dawn of the Korean War).215 In the debates concerning military involvement in
Kosovo and Libya, certain members of Congress sought to aggressively hold the
President to the WPR (arguably for more political than institutional reasons),216
but others felt the wiser option was to offer criticism but remain uncommitted to

211. See Baker, supra note 207 (commenting that “Presidents of both parties have refused to
acknowledge the constitutionality of the War Powers Act of 1973”).
212. See id. (noting that while President Obama has asked Congress to impose a limit on
American military action abroad and repeal the 2002 authorization of President George W. Bush’s
war in Iraq, he did not seek a similar limit on his authority to “conduct a global war against Al
Qaeda and its affiliates”). The Obama administration faced criticism for this interpretation in both
the legal community and the press. See Pierce, supra note 207 (quoting Temple University law
professor Peter Spiro’s belief that “President Obama’s actions in Libya were vindicated by the
results, and presidents involved in future conflicts will cite Obama’s actions in Libya as legal
precedent”); see also Goldsmith & Waxman, supra note 208 (arguing that “Obama’s statement on
the need for congressional consent [in authorizing the use of military force in Syria], and the noted
contrast with [President George W. Bush] are . . . clarifying in their irony” where Obama has
developed “new precedents” creating a “legacy of expanded presidential power to use military
force,” such as the humanitarian intervention against ISIL on behalf of Iraqi civilians initiated in
August 2014).
213. See infra notes 214–17.
214. Jim Webb, Congressional Abdication, HARPER’S MAGAZINE, June 2013, http://harpers.
org/archive/2013/06/congressional-abdication/ (discussing the “reluctan[cy]” of “congressional
leaders” to “assert the authority that forms the basis of [American] government”).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 131–35.
216. See, e.g., Bartlett Joins Lawsuit Against Obama Over Libya, THE BALTIMORE SUN, June
15, 2011, http://weblogs.baltimoresun.com/news/local/politics/2011/06/bartlett_joins_lawsuit_
against.html (discussing how a bipartisan group of members of Congress filed a lawsuit against
President Obama over his military action in Libya; one of the members, Roscoe G. Bartlett, joined
a similar effort against President Clinton’s action in Yugoslavia).
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a particular stance.217 Together, this is the very picture of “congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence.”218
B. War Powers Consultation Act Overview
Previous efforts to reform or replace the WPR, of which there have been
many, have generally been firmly rooted in either the President-First or
Congress-First camp.219 The War Powers Consultation Act of 2014 (WPCA),
introduced by Senator Tim Kaine (D-Va.) and his colleagues John McCain (RAriz.) and Angus King (I-Me.), seeks to sidestep this eternal debate between
Congress-First and President-First advocates by setting up a structure in which
both sides’ prerogatives are meaningfully considered.220 The WPCA, modeled
after legislation proposed by a bipartisan commission led by former Secretaries
of State James A. Baker III and Warren Christopher,221 would repeal the WPR
and replace it with a flexible—albeit mandatory—system of Presidential
consultation with Congress, along with a mechanism for congressional approval
or disapproval.222
The proposed legislation requires the President to consult a newly-created
special Joint Congressional Consultation Committee before (or, in emergencies,
within three days of) “significant armed conflict,” which the Act defines as any
armed conflict lasting or expected to last more than one week.223 Additionally,

217. See supra Part I.E.2; see also HENDRICKSON, supra note 145, at 43, 65–67 (noting
Congress’s deference to President Clinton during his deployment of American forces in Haiti);
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Defending Deference: A Response to Professors Epstein and Wells, 69 MO.
L. REV. 959, 959 (2004) (stating that “members of Congress are prone to the same warped risk
assessment and political pressure as the executive branch”). This isn’t to say that there have not
been institutional stalwarts, particularly in the Senate, who have taken seriously the mandate to
ratify the decision to go to war: the Senate debate over Kosovo in 1998, where Senators John
Warner, John McCain, and Sam Nunn joined together to shepherd a resolution through to bipartisan
Senate passage, is a notable example of this. Id. at 43–67.
218. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
219. See BAKER, supra note 5, at 7 (“[U]ncertainty about war powers has precipitated a number
of calls for reform and yielded a variety of proposals over the years. These proposals have largely
been rejected or ignored, in many cases because they came down squarely on the side of one camp’s
view of the law and dismissed the other.”).
220. See generally S. Res. 1939, 113th Cong. (2014). The aim of the resolution is to correct
the problems that befell previous war powers resolutions, namely that they “ha[ve] not worked as
intended, and . . . added to the divisiveness and uncertainty that exists regarding the war powers of
the President and Congress”. Id. § 2(a)(1).
221. BAKER, supra note 5, at 6 (noting that Baker and Christopher were at the forefront of
finding a way to equalize the power of the President and Congress with respect to war-making
abilities).
222. Id. at 35–40 (outlining the main provisions of the WPCA).
223. “[S]ignificant armed conflict” is defined as “any conflict expressly authorized by
Congress, or any combat operation involving members of the Armed Forces lasting more than a

1038

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 64:1007

in the absence of a declaration of war or authorization for use of military force,
the Act requires the Joint Congressional Consultation Committee to introduce a
Joint Resolution of Approval no more than thirty days after the commencement
of hostilities; if the Joint Resolution of Approval is voted down, the Act allows
Congress to vote on a Joint Resolution of Disapproval shortly thereafter.224
III. THE WAR POWERS CONSULTATION ACT MAY JUST FORCE CONGRESS TO
DO ITS JOB, BUT HURDLES REMAIN
A. Forcing an Up-or-Down Vote
Ultimately, one of the main difficulties in fashioning an appropriate war
powers structure is ensuring that Congress does not abdicate its role in the
process. As Professor Ely points out, many members of Congress simply find it
convenient to allow the executive branch to assume responsibility for military
action, lest it go poorly in the end.225
This unfortunate reality is where the War Powers Consultation Act’s
automatic “Resolution of Approval” function in Section 7 is particularly
appropriate.226 The Act mandates that, in the absence of a declaration of war or
congressional authorization to use military force, the co-chairs of the Joint
Congressional Consultation Committee are to introduce a Concurrent
Resolution within thirty days of the initiation of significant armed conflict that
serves as congressional approval of the conflict.227 This legislation would be
fast-tracked through the committee process and put to a vote relatively quickly

week or expected by the President to last more than a week.” S. Res. 1939, 113th Cong., § 3(a)
(2014). Exceptions to this one-week benchmark include actions taken to repel attacks or prevent
imminent attacks, limited reprisals against terrorists, humanitarian missions, covert action, and
missions to rescue U.S. personnel. Id. § 3(b); see also BAKER, supra note 5, at 35–36 (discussing
situations that would and would not qualify as “significant armed conflict”).
224. S. Res. 1939, 113th Cong., §§ 7(a)(1), (b)(1) (2014).
225. See generally ELY, supra note 46, at 48–54 (discussing congressional reluctance to be
part of the decision-making process of going to war). This political reluctance is not unjustified.
It is not a stretch for one to argue that Hillary Clinton would currently be in her second term as
President had she not voted in support of the Iraq War authorization. Pub.L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat.
1498 (2002); see Philip Rucker, Hillary Clinton on Iraq Vote: ‘I Still Got It Wrong. Plain and
Simple,’ WASH. POST (June 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/
2014/06/05/hillary-clinton-on-iraq-vote-i-still-got-it-wrong-plain-and-simple/ (commenting that
Clinton’s authorization of the Iraq War “dogged her with the Democratic Party’s antiwar activist
base in the 2008 presidential primaries”).
226. S. Res. 1939, 113th Cong., § 7(a) (2014) (requiring a congressional resolution for
approval or disapproval of presidentially-instigated military action).
227. See id.; see also BAKER, supra note 5, at 39 (discussing the congressional approval or
disapproval mechanism in Section 7; note that in the original Baker-Christopher proposal this
provision is contained in Section 5, while in Senator Kaine’s legislation it is found in Section 7).
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in both Houses of Congress.228 If either House fails to pass the Resolution of
Approval, any member of the House or Senate may then introduce a Resolution
of Disapproval that would also be fast-tracked.229 This would require each
member to stand on one side or another—an imposition not present under the
WPR—in plain, simple language that would be difficult to obfuscate or
rationalize.230 While nothing would stop members from voting against both
resolutions, the simple and high-profile nature of each vote would ensure that
each representative’s constituents knew how he or she voted.231
B. BUT: Clever Lawyers Still Have Places to Claim Expansive Executive
Authority
Still, from the prospective of constructing legislation designed to ensure that
Congress does its job, the bill is not without some weaknesses.232 First, the Act
does nothing to constrain the potential for excessively broad readings of
statutory language.233 Because the Act encourages specific congressional
authorization of military action, one could envision a President seeking
authorization utilizing ambiguous terms that are subject to broad construction,
negating any limitations on specificity.234 Indeed, this has been the case with
the continued reliance on the Authorization for Use of Military Force of 2001
(AUMF).235 The AUMF initially referred to the perpetrators of the September
11 attacks and those who harbored them, but has been expanded far beyond its
original bounds to encompass drone strikes in Yemen, special operations raids

228. See S. Res. 1939, 113th Cong., § 7(a)(5)(A) (2014) (stating that a motion to proceed with
an approval resolution is “highly privileged in the House of Representatives and . . . privileged in
the Senate and not debatable”); see also BAKER, supra note 5, at 39 (discussing the expedited
hearing route).
229. See S. Res. 1939, 113th Cong., § 7(b)(2)(A) (2014) (noting that motions to proceed with
resolutions for disapproval are privileged similarly to motions to proceed with resolutions for
approval); see also BAKER, supra note 5, at 39 (discussing an additional expedited process for
disapproval resolutions under the WPCA).
230. Press Release, Sen. Tim Kaine, Kaine, McCain Introduce Bill to Reform War Powers
Resolution (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.kaine.senate.gov/press-releases/kaine-mccain-introducebill-to-reform-war-powers-resolution (arguing that the Act would “increas[e] the knowledge of the
population and the accountability of our elected officials”).
231. Id.
232. See infra notes 233–36.
233. See, e.g., Patrick D. Robbins, The War Powers Resolution After Fifteen Years: A
Reassessment, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 141, 161 (1988) (stating that some Presidents have waited to
notify Congress of military action that is underway or complete, or simply deny the existence of
such action altogether); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–
20, 329 (1936) (concluding that the executive branch must be given wide latitude to craft foreign
policy that is in the nation’s best interests).
234. See S. Res. 1939, 113th Cong., § 2 (2014).
235. Authorization for Use of Military Force of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
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in Somalia, and recent airstrikes in Iraq and Syria.236 One could easily imagine
a scenario in which a President argues that the WPCA has not been triggered
because the military action subject to scrutiny is linked, and therefore included,
under pre-existing authorization (even if only as a pretext).
In order to forestall executive usage of previous AUMFs in creative ways,
Congress should amend the WPCA to provide more specificity with respect to
the required features of congressional declarations of war or authorizations for
use of military force. Though the nature of conflict in the twenty-first century
may necessarily preclude Congress from placing geographical limits on
locations where military force may be used, or specific nations or organizations
targeted, in the absence of these limits it seems vital to put in place a “sunset
provision” that would limit the temporal scope of authorized combat
operations.237 To this end, Congress should amend the WPCA with the
following language by expanding the Section 3 definitions section as follows:

236. See, e.g., Kylie Alexandra, Battlefield Earth: The Danger of Executive Overreach in the
Global Fight Against Terrorism and Why Congress Must Act, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 456, 459–
60 (2014) (discussing the invocation of AUMF in Yemen); Beau D. Barnes, Reauthorizing the
“War on Terror”: The Legal and Policy Implications of the AUMF’s Coming Obsolescence, 211
MIL. L. REV. 57, 67 (2012) (remarking that shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks, “no one
seriously questioned the . . . ‘War on Terror’” and that it is “unclear” if the AUMF permits “targeted
killings” in countries other than Afghanistan); Robert Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond al
Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 163, 173–
74 (2013) (noting that AUMF includes “detention authority” that applies to “persons who are
members or supporters of al Qaeda”); Graham Cronogue, A New AUMF: Defining Combatants in
the War on Terror, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 377, 380 (2012) (“In addition to Afghanistan, the
AUMF could authorize force against any other states that the President determined participated in
the [September 11, 2001] attacks or harbored any of the organizations or people responsible for the
attacks.”). In October 2014, after the sixty-day window under the WPR had expired for the U.S.
bombing campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS or
IS), the Obama Administration stated that the WPR did not apply to the bombing campaign
“[b]ecause the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs constitute specific [authorization] within the meaning of the
War Powers Resolution.” Spencer Ackerman, White House Says Expired War Powers Timetable
Irrelevant to Isis Campaign, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2014/oct/15/white-house-war-powers-resolution-iraq (quoting Bernadette Meehan,
spokeswoman for the National Security Council); see also Jack Goldsmith, The Administration Has
Violated the War Powers Resolution Unless It is Right About the Applicability of the AUMFs to the
Islamic State, LAWFARE (Oct. 8, 2014, 7:50 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/10/theadministration-has-violated-the-war-powers-resolution-unless-it-is-right-about-the-applicabilityof-the-aumfs-to-the-islamic-state/ (“[I]f the President is wrong about the applicability of the
AUMFs to the Islamic state [there] is . . . a problem under the WPR.”).
237. Indeed, current discussion among Senators and legal academics for a replacement of the
2001 AUMF to include ISIL contemplates such a provision, and President Obama includes a threeyear limit in his request for such an Authorization. See supra note 173; Press Release, Sen. Tim
Kaine, Kaine Introduces Authorization for Use of Military Force Against ISIL (Sept. 17, 2014),
http://www.kaine.senate.gov/press-releases/kaine-introduces-authorization-for-use-of-military-for
ce-against-isil (proposing a one-year sunset provision); Rosa Brooks et al., Principles to Guide
Congressional Authorization of the Continued Use of Force Against ISIL, JUST SECURITY
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For the purposes of this Act, a congressional declaration of war shall
include a specific description of the nation against which the United
States is going to war. For the purposes of this Act, a congressional
authorization for the use of military force without a specified
geographical scope or specified nation or organizations against which
force is authorized shall include a provision limiting the application of
the authorization to a specified period of time.238
With the addition of this language, Congress retains enough flexibility to
address the realities of twenty-first century combat and authorize military action
against transnational non-state organizations without geographical scope, while
still imposing a substantial limitation by requiring a sunset provision.239 While
this language would allow the executive branch to prosecute war against
transnational terrorist organizations throughout the globe for a specified period
of time after authorization from Congress, it would also prevent the executive
branch from using a preexisting authorization against other organizations or
nations not initially contemplated by the framers of the original authorization (as
the Obama Administration has used the 2001 AUMF to justify military action
against ISIL over a decade later) because it obligates Congress to reassess the
authorization after the specified time period.240

(Nov. 10, 2014), http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ISIL-AUMF-Statement.pdf
(proposing an eighteen-to-twenty-four month sunset provision); Robert Chesney et al., A Draft
AUMF to Get the Discussion Going, LAWFARE (Nov. 10, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.
com/2014/11/a-draft-aumf-to-get-the-discussion-going/ (proposing a thirty-six-month sunset
provision); contra John Bellinger, The Lame Duck Congress Should Not Sunset the 2001 AUMF,
LAWFARE (Nov. 11, 2014, 7:53 PM) http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/11/the-lame-duckcongress-should-not-sunset-the-2001-aumf/ (“I remain concerned about sun-setting congressional
authorization to use force to defend the United States . . . . The conflict with al Qaida and associated
groups shows no sign of ending within [a three-year sunset period].”).
238. This formulation assumes that Congress would utilize the formal “declaration of war”
only against other nations, in line with the traditional conception of the term. See ELSEA &
GRIMMETT, supra note 68, at 1–4. A declaration of war would also authorize total war against the
other nation, without geographical limitation. See infra note 239. On the other hand, the
“authorization for use of military force” may be used by Congress either against other nations or
against non-state actors such as al Qaeda or ISIL. See Authorization for Use of Military Force of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); supra notes 236–37. An authorization by Congress
could also be narrowly tailored to authorize limited war, as Congress did in the Quasi-War. See
supra Part I.C.1.
239. Note that a declaration of war traditionally authorized the use of force against the citizens,
installations, and supply lines of an identified nation without any geographical scope. See, e.g.,
Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40 (1800) (Washington, J.) (“If it be declared in form, it is called
solemn . . . because one whole nation is at war with another whole nation; and all the members of
the nation declaring war, are authori[z]ed to commit hostilities against all the members of the other,
in every place, and under every circumstance.”). Thus, if Congress wished to formally declare war
against a nation, there would be no geographical scope or sunset provision as a matter of course.
240. President-First advocates, such as John Yoo, may argue that this provision
unconstitutionally constrains the President’s Commander-in-Chief power, that the Constitution is
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Another WPCA section susceptible to broad construction is the Act’s
definition of “significant armed conflict” found in Section 3, which lists
numerous exceptions to the rule that the WPCA will apply to all conflicts lasting
over one week.241 According to the Act, “significant armed conflict” does not
consist of either “[a]ctions taken by the President to repel attacks, or to prevent
imminent attacks, on the United States, its territorial possessions, its embassies,
its consulates, or its Armed Forces abroad” or “[l]imited acts of reprisal against
terrorists or states that sponsor terrorism.”242 Though protection of lives,
property, and acts of reprisal are Article II powers that Presidents have generally
claimed over the last 225 years, there is still a danger that a President might use,
for instance, a rescue attempt as a pretext for sustained military action without
congressional authorization.243
The potential to use a particular event, despite its pretextual nature, to justify
military action is where the notorious WPR “reporting” requirements would
actually prove to be of use.244 Section 6 of the WPCA requires consultation and
submission of a written report to the Joint Congressional Consultation
Committee either before or within three calendar days of the initiation of
“significant armed conflict.”245 However, the WPCA does not require
contemporaneous reporting of military action that has not risen to the level of
“significant armed conflict;” rather, it only requires a single written report,
issued annually, listing all operations—both “significant” (for purposes of the
WPCA) and not,246 despite the risk of such an operation leading to a full-scale
war.247
designed to give “flexib[ility]” in foreign affairs decision-making, and that, more often than not,
Congress has not authorized presidential military action. See YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND
PEACE, supra note 60, at 11–12. However, nothing in this limitation on congressional authorization
would constrain the President’s “supergeneral” authority to deploy military forces for limited,
circumscribed purposes without congressional authorization. See Bracknell, supra note 51, at 221
(noting that “history shows that power is narrowly circumscribed in scope, but practically
unconstrained in terms of frequency,” and that “[a]bsent the existence of a ‘state of war,’ the
President retains the authority necessary to employ forces consistent with his role as the nation’s
first general”).
241. See S. Res. 1939, 113th Cong., § 3(a) (2014).
242. Id. § 3(b).
243. The risk that a limited use of military force under Article II authority would then lead to
a larger scale conflict is one that the United States has grappled with since the days of Presidents
Adams and Jefferson. See supra Part I.C (discussing the Quasi-War and the First Barbary War).
The initial stages of the Korean War reflected these concerns. See supra Part I.D.1. Indeed, the
Obama Administration argued that the WPR did not apply to the air campaign against Colonel
Gadhafi for very similar reasons. See supra text accompanying notes 194–95.
244. See supra Part I.E.1 (discussing presidential compliance with WPR reporting
requirements).
245. S. Res. 1939, 113th Cong., § 6(a)–(b) (2014).
246. Id. § 6(c)–(d).
247. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
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In order to ensure Congress is adequately informed of all Article II operations,
including those that may not rise to the level of “significant armed conflict,”
Congress should add a subsection (e) to Section 6 stating the following:
(e) Reporting of other operations as described in section 3(b).—The
President shall notify the Joint Congressional Consultation Committee
of other operations as described in section 3(b) of this act within the
same timeframe as specified in section 6(b). The President shall
designate an official or officials of the executive branch to carry out
this function. Notification may be in the form of a written report,
secure electronic communication, secure telephone conversation, inperson meeting, or another form.
This addition ensures that Congress remains notified of all operations, even
those not considered a “significant armed conflict,” but also removes some of
the “kabuki dance” character of the WPR’s reporting requirement.248 Further, it
makes clear that notification need not be in the form of a formal written report
issued in the name of the President; a simple secure encrypted telephone
conversation between staff of the National Security Council and Joint
Congressional Consultation Committee would satisfy the requirement. At the
same time, the transmission of this information would help to build the spirit of
trust and consultation that is one of the main goals of the WPCA.249
IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the War Powers Consultation Act is a strong piece of legislation.
It takes into account 225 years of practice under the Constitution. By
acknowledging the enduring conflict between Congress-First and President-First
approaches, while seeking an equitable compromise between the principles

248. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
249. See BAKER, supra note 5, at 9–10 (stating that “[h]istory suggests that building broadbased support for a military campaign—from both branches of government and the public—is often
vital to success” and that “much of the distrust and tension that at times can characterize interbranch relationships can be dissipated and overcome” through regular meetings between the
President and the proposed Joint Congressional Consultation Committee). Some may argue that
an additional reporting requirement favors congressional war-making authority and defeats the
purpose of the balanced recommendations of the National War Powers Commission. See, e.g., id.
at 10 (discussing the possibility that the WPCA may be seen as altering the balance of war-making
powers); supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the argument that the President has the capability of
committing the nation to war without legislative constraints or authorization). However, even with
this additional reporting requirement, considering the old adage “knowledge is power,” the
executive branch still has a decided advantage in the area of information, especially given the
President’s “supergeneral” role directing the operations of the Armed Forces. See Bracknell, supra
note 51, at 219–20 (remarking that although Congress may be responsible for “raising” and
“equipping” forces, the discretion required to effectively make strategic and tactical decisions falls
to the President). Thus, requiring additional information would empower Congress, but not beyond
the scope of its constitutionally-assigned responsibility to take the nation to war.
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defining the two factions, the WPCA manages to empower Congress without
undermining the constitutional authority afforded to the President.250 It
recognizes and partially remedies the inherent tendency of Congress to
demonstrate “inertia, indifference[,] or quiescence” in the decision to take the
nation to war by compelling each and every Representative to make a clear
statement in either support or opposition to the military action.251 At the same
time, this requirement restrains the executive branch from waging war hidden in
Justice Jackson’s “zone of twilight,”252 presumably stimulating an informed
electorate to participate in public debate on the merits of sending the nation to
war, and in turn bestowing constitutional and political legitimacy upon the
armed conflict that may result. This is the least we can do, as a nation, for the
men and women who wear the uniform and serve in its defense: that we make
the fateful decision to send them to war only with the full support of their
government and the American people.

250. See BAKER, supra note 5, at 7 (stating that the proposals underlying the WPCA are
designed to be “practical, fair, and realistic,” with a “reasonable chance of support from both the
President and Congress,” and that “requir[ing] constructing a proposal that avoids clearly favoring
one branch over the other”).
251. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
252. Id. To this point, Justice Jackson noted, “[i]n this area, any actual test of power is likely
to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
theories of law.” Id.

